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Utah Manufacturers Asscinahon, yi.fih F'^'roleuni Associa-
Association appeai as amici curiae, pursu-
ant to an order . - dated September 8, 1987, and file 
this brief to dbbib in its re ,ie * oi I, his matter. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
This brIe£ is limited 1 < > the fo11owIng issue: 
Whether immunity of "statutory employers" 
from civil liability under the Utah's 
Workmen's Compensation Act is In the public 
interest. 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions are relevant to the 
matter at issue: 
Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-42. The following 
constitute employers subject to the provi-
sions of this title: . . . 
(3) As used in this section: 
(b) Where any employer procures any 
work to be done wholly or in part for him by 
a contractor over whose work he retains 
supervision or control, and this work is a 
part or process in the trade or business of 
the employer, the contractor, all persons 
employed by himr all subcontractors under 
him, and all persons employed by any of these 
subcontractors, are considered employees of 
the original employer. 
Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-60. r: :\e ngnt : v 
recover compensation pursuant to the prov . 
sions of this title for injuries sustained by 
an employee, whether resulting in death or 
not, shall be the exclusive remedy against 
the employer and shall be the exclusive rem-
edy against any officer, agent or employee of 
the employer and the liabilities of the 
employer imposed by this act shall be in 
place of any and all other civil liability 
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to 
such employee or to his spouse, widow, chil-
dren, parents, dependents, next of kin, 
heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or 
any other person whomsoever, on account of 
any accident or injury or death, in any way 
contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred 
by such employee in the course of or because 
of or arising out of his employment, and no 
action at law may be maintained against an 
employer or against any officer, agent or 
employee of the employer based upon any acci-
dent, injury or death of an employee,. 
Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-62. When any 
injury or death for which compensation is 
payable under this title shall have been 
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a 
person other than an employer, officer, 
agent, or employee of said employer, the 
injured employee, or in case of death his 
dependents, may claim compensation and the 
injured employee or his heirs or personal 
representative may also have an action for 
damages against such third person . . . 
For the purposes of this section and 
notwithstanding the provisions of section 
35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or 
personal representative may also maintain an 
action for damages against subcontractors, 
general contractors, independent contractors, 
property owners or their lessees or assigns, 
not occupying an employee-employer relation-
ship with the injured or deceased employee at 
the time of his injury or death. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
These amici curiae concur in the statement of the case 
set forth in the brief of Marathon Steel Company. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. 
\ 35-1-1 et seg. , 1 11'P similar legislation of many other states, 
i'ef ler ts legislatively determined policy that employers sub-
jected to the possibility of strict liability imposed by the 
workmen's compensation scheme for injuria " *" individuals injured 
in the course of their employment should :e protected from any 
additional potential liability through civ. actions sounding in 
t. o r t . - *. - - r i n i t i on o f " emp 1 o y e i " i r i t h e A t benefits 
every employee of a contractor or subcontractor fay greatly reduc-
ing ; ,; e possibility that the employee, if injured, will be unable 
*e ' ei wnrRniei " \ ompensat ion benefits from some source. It 
also directly burdens and places an additional cost of doing 
business on every person or entity who contracts with an indepen-
dent contractor subcontractor for the performance of work, 
while a\ the same time limiting the exposure of the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund. As a matter of public policy, eve: > employer 
subject to such exposure, whether direct or contingent, should be 
immune from tort liability provided under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. 
One of the policies behind the expanded definition of 
"employer1 provided in t .he Utah statute is to provi^- ,r incen-
IlLivf In tvn h pPi,M u *ho coi itr acts \* - * ,- jntrac-
tor oi' subcontractor to make s'-re * -• • --or- *arto or 
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subcontractor is carrying the required workmen's compensation 
insurance. That policy would be undermined if a statutory 
employer who did require such coverage by its contractors or 
subcontractors were penalized by the often greater, open-ended 
exposure under civil tort law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. EMPLOYERS SUBJECTED TO POTENTIAL WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION LIABILITY ARE LIKEWISE APPROPRI-
ATELY ENTITLED TO TORT IMMUNITY. 
Utah's Workers1 Compensation Act is quite similar to 
the workmen's compensation provisions of numerous other states, 
in that, through the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
S 35-1-42(3)(b)(Supp. 1987)f it extends liability for workmen's 
compensation coverage beyond the direct employer to include indi-
rect employers, such as general contractors and even property 
owners. 1C A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law S 49.11 at 9-2 
(1986). The purpose behind this expansion of the definition of 
"employer" has been described by this Court as follows: 
The above-quoted language from Section 
35-1-42 is used in a class of statutes known 
as "statutory employer" or "contractor under" 
statutes. Most states have such statutes, 
the purpose of which is 
to protect employees of irrespon-
sible and uninsured subcontractors 
by imposing ultimate liability on 
the presumably responsible princi-
pal contractor, who has it within 
his power, in choosing subcontrac-
tors, to pass upon their responsi-
bility and insist upon appropriate 
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compensation protection for their 
workers. 
1C A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, 
S 49.11 at 9-11 (1982). Accord Lee v. Chev-
ron Oil Company, Utah, 565 P.2d 1128 (1977). 
An additional purpose of the statutory 
provision is to prevent an unscrupulous prin-
cipal contractor who contracts out all or 
most of his work from avoiding responsibility 
for insuring his subcontractors. 
Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 305, 307 (Utah 1984). 
The policy behind the provision can perhaps best be understood as 
a desire to achieve a double purpose: On the one hand, to pre-
vent an actual employer from avoiding workmen's compensation lia-
bility by doing its business through non-substantial independent 
contractor or subcontractor arrangements, and, on the other hand, 
to affirmatively encourage persons or entities who do contract 
out work to a contractor or subcontractor to be responsible for 
ensuring that such contractors and subcontractors have provided 
the necessary and required workmen's compensation coverage. 
The public policy behind the grant of immunity from 
civil tort liability provided by statutes such as Utah Code Ann. 
S 35-1-60 (1974), is described by Professor Larson as follows: 
Once a workmen's compensation act has become 
applicable either through compulsion or elec-
tion, it affords the exclusive remedy for the 
injury by the employee or his dependents 
against the employer and insurance carrier. 
This is part of the quid pro quo in which the 
sacrifices and gains of employees and employ-
ers are to some extent put in balance, for, 
while the employer assumes a new liability 
without fault, he is relieved of the prospect 
of large damage verdicts. 
2A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, S 65.10, at 12-1, 12-9 
(1987). In other words, persons or entities who are subjected to 
exposure for potential liability and the resulting necessity to 
obtain insurance coverage for workmen's compensation claims are 
protected from dual exposure. To make an employer potentially 
strictly liable for compensation for lost wages up to certain 
limits and medical expenses without limit, as provided under the 
Utah Act, without regard to the employer's "fault," and at the 
same time leave that same employer potentially subject to liabil-
ity in tort for substantial additional claims, such as for pain 
and suffering, lost earning ability above and beyond the statu-
tory limit, compensation for disfigurement, etc., would place an 
unexpected and unwarranted burden on an employer. 
This policy makes no distinction between direct employ-
ers and employers subject to liability exposure by virtue of the 
statutory definition of "employer" in Utah Code Ann. 
S 35-1-42(3) (b) (Supp. 1987). To argue that only direct employ-
ers, or direct employers and any statutory employer against whom 
benefits are awarded, have provided the necessary quid pro quo to 
be entitled to tort immunity under the Act is illogical and does 
not square with the foundations of the policy. Each direct 
employer and each potential statutory employer faces the same 
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exposure, that of providing benefits out of its own funds or 
through insurance which it has purchased. Indeed, the total 
actual cost to an indirect employer who dutifully requires cover-
age of its contractors or subcontractors may be greater than the 
cost to the direct employer, since not only will the indirect 
employer pay the cost of its own workmen's compensation premiums, 
but it will also certainly share in the cost of its contractors1 
premiums which are passed through to it under the costs of the 
contracts. 
Moreover, the exposure to which statutory employers are 
subject provides an additional public benefit in that it 
decreases the risk that the Uninsured Employers1 Fund created by 
the Legislature in 1986 will be called upon to pay claims. See 
Jacobsen v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 60 Adv.Rep. 4 5 (Utah 
App. 1987). Here, too, the public interest is served, because 
the policy thus enhances the fund's ability to pay claims in the 
reduced number of cases where there is no insurance coverage and 
no solvent employer to pay benefits directly. 
Professor Larson notes in his treatise that, while 
early cases on the issue tended to deny the benefit of the exclu-
sive remedy provisions of workmen's compensation laws to parties 
other than the actual direct employer, the better reasoned 
approach, and the clear modern trend, is to recognize that all 
employers, including indirect "statutory" employers, are 
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providing a benefit to workers protected by the workmen's compen-
sation laws, and should be entitled to the benefit of the exclu-
sive remedy provisions of those laws. Professor Larson comments: 
Since the general contractor is thereby, in 
effect, made the employer for the purposes of 
the compensation statute, it is obvious that 
he should enjoy the regular immunity of an 
employer from third-party suit when the facts 
are such that he could be made liable for 
compensation; and the great majority of cases 
have so held. 
2A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Laws, § 72.31(a) at 14-112 
(1987). Professor Larson continues: 
But when the facts necessary to the general 
contractor's liability are not complete, as 
when the subcontractor is insured under a 
statute limiting the general contractor's 
liability to uninsured subcontractor situa-
tions, there is a sharp split of opinion. 
For many years, a comfortable majority of 
jurisdictions held that the general contrac-
tor in these circumstances remained a third 
party subject to common-law liability. But 
there has been a marked trend in more recent 
times toward granting immunity to the general 
contractor when the subcontractor was 
insured, and even when compensation has been 
actually paid under the subcontractor's pol-
icy. . . . 
. . . [The] sounder result would seem to 
be the holding that the overall responsi-
1 Larson specifically refers to general contractors because in 
many states "statutory employer" liability only extends to gen-
eral contractors and not to "owners" or other principals. See, 
IC A. Larson Workmen's Compensation Laws, S 49.13 at 9-7 through 
9-8 (1986). Nevertheless, at least in Utah, the same arguments 
apply to any statutory employer, whether general contractor or 
principal. 
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bility of the general contractor for getting 
subcontractors insured, and his latent lia-
bility for compensation if he does not, 
should be sufficient to remove him from the 
category of "third party." He is under a 
continuing potential liability; he has thus 
assumed a burden in exchange for which he 
might well be entitled to immunity from dam-
age suits, regardless of whether on the facts 
of a particular case actual liability exists. 
This burden may also be translated into 
financial terms, as was done by the First 
Circuit when it pointed out that the general 
contractor, by insisting that the subcontrac-
tor carry compensation insurance, imposes a 
cost on the subcontractor which the subcon-
tractor will pass on to the contractor in his 
charges under the subcontract. 
2A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Laws, § 72.31(b) at 14-119 
through 14-135 (1987) (referring to Musick v. Puerto Rico Tele-
phone Co., 357 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1966)). 
The courts of a number of other jurisdictions have rec-
ognized the wisdom of this approach and have expressly held that 
tort immunity under workmen's compensation laws extends to indi-
rect statutory employers. For instance, in Burk v. Cities Serv-
ice Oil Company of Delaware, 266 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1959), the 
court held that, because of the exclusive remedy provision of the 
Oklahoma Workmen's Compensation Act, the employee of an indepen-
dent contractor could not maintain a tort action against his 
indirect statutory employer even though the employee had received 
his workmen's compensation benefits from his direct employer's 
insurance carrier. The court commented: 
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The immunity from the common-law liabil-
ity derives from the principal employer's 
secondary liability for workmen's compensa-
tion under Section 11 to employees of an 
independent contractor. And, this is appar-
ently so even if the independent contractor 
has complied with the Workmen's Compensation 
Act and the injured employee has been duly 
compensated thereunder. . . . It follows 
that the common-law remedy against negligent 
third-party tort-feasors preserved under 
Section 44 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 
is available to an injured and compensated 
employee, only when the hazardous work being 
performed by his employer at the time of his 
injury was not an integral part of or related 
to the business of a principal employer in a 
manner to secondarily obligate such employer 
under § 11 of the act for a compensation 
award to the injured employee. 
Id., 266 F.2d at 435. 
Similarly, in Edwards v. Price, 550 P.2d 856 (Colo. 
1976), the Supreme Court of Colorado held that a general contrac-
tor, which had subcontracted certain electrical work, was not 
liable in negligence for the death of an employee of the subcon-
tractor, inasmuch as that employee was a statutory employee of 
the general contractor. The survivors of the subcontractor's 
employee, who had been killed when run over by a truck driven by 
the general contractor's employee, had previously filed a 
workmen's compensation claim and that claim had been paid by 
either the subcontractor or its insurance carrier. The court 
commented as follows: 
The public policy upon which the 
Workmen's Compensation Act is founded derives 
from the need to provide monetary relief for 
-10-
workmen injured in the course of their 
employment, regardless of the negligence of 
the employer or the lack of negligence on the 
part of the employee. • . . It is further 
the policy in Colorado and the great majority 
of states to make the more financially sol-
vent general contractor ultimately responsi-
ble for workmen's compensation benefits aris-
ing out of injuries to employees of all sub-
contractors. . . . 
In return for this ultimate statutory 
liability, the general contractor is relieved 
of any liability for "contribution or action 
of any kind." . . . 
It is the general contractor to whom the 
employees of all subcontractors may look for 
workmen's compensation if their immediate 
employer is uninsured or financially irre-
sponsible. . . . 
In the case of State ex rel. First National Bank & 
Trust Company of Helena v. District Court, 505 P.2d 408 (Mont, 
1973), the Supreme Court of Montana held that statutory employers 
were entitled to tort immunity under Montana's Workmen's Compen-
sation Act. The employee of a subcontractor had received 
workmen's compensation benefits but sought to sue the principal 
(a bank) and its general contractor on a negligence theory, 
Montana's statute specifically provided that if an indirect 
employer had required that its independent contractor maintain 
workmen's compensation coverage, the employee of the independent 
contractor could only look to his direct employer and its insur-
ance carrier for workmen's compensation coverage. The court 
dismissed the complaint as against both the general contractor 
-11-
and the principal. The court discussed at great length the 
philosophical underpinnings of Montana statutory scheme: 
Plaintiff claims that the bank cannot be 
considered to be the "employer" of plaintiff, 
since there was no direct contract between 
the two. . . . However, the employer's 
liability for compensation and corresponding 
immunity from third party suits does not 
depend solely on the above definition of 
"employer;" it also encompasses the concept 
of "statutory employer" so that if a person 
is deemed to be a "statutory employer" he is 
liable for compensation and thus immune from 
third party suits. . . . 
[The general contractor], by requiring 
[the subcontractor] to carry workmen's 
compensation on its own employees, clearly is 
protected from third party suits. . . . The 
question remains whether the Bank is entitled 
to the same immunity in the absence of a 
direct contractual requirement that the 
plaintiff's immediate employer carry work-
men's compensation. We hold that it is. 
We can reach this decision in two ways. 
First, in the absence of workmen's compen-
sation coverage by either [the subcontractor] 
or [the general contractor], clearly under 
the statute the Bank would not be entitled to 
the independent contractor defense, and would 
thus be deemed to the plaintiff's "statutory 
employer". Second, the Bank complied with 
the intent of the statute that all persons 
working on the construction would be covered 
by workmen's compensation. Accordingly, the 
Bank is entitled to its quid pro quo --
immunity from third party negligence actions. 
Id,, 505 P.2d at 410, 412. 
This Court, without going to great lengths to discuss 
its reasoning in so doing, has already aligned itself with those 
-12-
cases adopting the modern and better reasoned view. See, e.g. , 
Hinds v. Herm Hughes and Sons, Inc., 577 P.2d 561 (Utah 1978); 
Lee v, Chevron Oil Company, 565 P.2d 1128 (Utah 1977). No 
changes in the interests of the citizens of this state suggest 
that this Court should now reverse its position and align itself 
with those jurisdictions following the older view. There is no 
reason for this Court to change course at this time by reading 
into S 35-1-62 of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act a narrower 
definition of the term "employer" than that applied throughout 
the remainder of that Act. 
II. STATUTORY EMPLOYERS SHOULD NOT BE PENALIZED 
FOR SUCCESSFULLY REQUIRING THEIR CONTRACTORS 
AND SUBCONTRACTORS TO MAINTAIN WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION INSURANCE COVERAGE. 
One reason which justifies the expansive definition of 
"employer" under the workers1 compensation laws, such as that 
provided by Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-42(3) (b) (Supp. 1987), is to 
induce every person or entity who does business with an indepen-
dent contractor or subcontractor to make sure that those contrac-
tors maintain the necessary workmen's compensation coverage. 
If only those "statutory employers" who actually end up 
providing workmen's compensation benefits, either directly or 
through their workmen's compensation insurance policies, were 
accorded immunity from civil tort liability, the consequence 
would be to eliminate the incentive to parties contracting for 
-13-
the performance of work to make sure that the independent con-
tractor has coverage. An indirect employer might conclude that 
it would rather run the risk of exposure under the workmen's 
compensation statute than the sometimes far greater risk of 
liability under ordinary tort principles, and might, therefore, 
deliberately contract with independent contractors who had no 
workmen's compensation coverage so as to save money on the 
contract price. The employer who conscientiously obtained an 
insurance binder from his contractor, or the general contractor 
who obtained such a binder from his subcontractor, might ration-
ally do so only if the total risk of liability under civil tort 
principles was deemed to be less than the risk of liability under 
the workmen's compensation law. In many cases, the trade-off 
might appear to be even, so that the public policy underlying the 
statutory employer definition would be undercut, leaving no 
incentive upon indirect employers to make sure that the required 
coverage had been provided by their independent contractors. 
Indeed, as noted by Professor Larson, even though the independent 
contractor may be paying its own insurance premiums, those 
premiums are, at least in the typical case, a cost of doing 
business which is passed up the line to the party ultimately 
paying for the work, the owner. See, 2A A. Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation Laws, S 72.31(b) at 14-119 through 14-135 (1987), 
quoted above. If the owner or other "statutory employer" 
-14-
considers the liability trade-off to be an even oner then the 
additional cost of having the independent contractor provide the 
required insurance may not be justified to the owner in pure 
economic terms. 
This policy concern has been recognized by other 
courts. For instance, in State ex rel. First National Bank & 
Trust Co. v. District Court, supra, the court noted: 
The intent of the statute is to guaran-
tee the protection of all employees working 
on the job by encouraging the owner to 
require the immediate employer to carry 
workmen's compensation on his own employees. 
The intent of such statute would be self-
defeating if the owner who required this was 
entitled to no immunity from common-law 
actions. 
Id. , 505 P.2d at 411. Professor Larson has commented similarly: 
The object of the "contractor under" statutes 
is to give the general contractor an incen-
tive to require subcontractors to carry 
insurance. But if the general contractor 
does conscientiously insist on this insur-
ance, his reward, under [cases holding the 
statutory employer not to have civil immun-
ity] is loss of exemption from third-party 
suit. 
2A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Laws, S 72.31(b) at 14-134 
(1987). 
If this Court now were persuaded to alter the statutory 
employer law in Utah, it would be creating a disincentive fcr 
statutory employers to take steps to ensure that their indepen-
dent contractors are maintaining the required workmen's 
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compensation insurance coverage. Rather than upset the incentive 
scheme created by the legislature, this Court should continue to 
hold that statutory employers are protected by the exclusive 
remedy provision of the Utah Act. 
CONCLUSION 
It is in the interest of the citizens of Utah for this 
Court to reaffirm the position it has previously taken in Hinds 
v. Herm Hughes and Sons, Inc., and Lee v. Chevron Oil Company, 
supra, and, thus, to continue its support for a well-established 
and widely accepted public policy which has a clear basis in 
logic. The Utah Workmen's Compensation Act does not distinguish 
between direct and indirect employers in providing immunity from 
civil tort liability. Nothing speaks for this Court to create 
such a distinction and through judicial pronouncement to under-
mine the public policies upon which the applicable provisions of 
the Act are based. 
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